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STATEMENT OF JURISIDICTION 
The Court of Appeals entered an Order of Affirmance on 
June 13, 1989, in accordance with the provisions of Rule 31, 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. From the foregoing Order, 
the Plaintiff has filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with 
the Supreme Court of Utah in accordance with the provisions of 
Rules 42-48, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
A. Whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
correctly held that Defendant, Dr. Lonnie Paulos (Dr. Paulos), 
owed no legal duty to Plaintiff, Dr. Jonathan Home (Plaintiff) 
in connection with the examination which Dr. Paulos performed of 
Plaintifffs former patient and in communicating the results of 
his findings to the patient and the patient's attorney. 
B. Whether the District Court and the Court of Appeals 
correctly held that Plaintiff's claim against Dr. Paulos for 
"injurious falsehood" is governed by the one-year statute of 
limitations contained in Section 78-12-29, U.C.A. 
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DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The case was heard by the Court of Appeals in accordance 
with the provisions of Rule 31, Rules of Utah Court of Appeals • 
On June 13, 1989, the Court of Appeals entered an Order of 
Affirmance which upheld the Summary Judgment in favor of Dr. 
Paulos. 
CONTROLLING STATUTE 
The statute of limitations contained in Section 
78-12-19, U.C.A., is controlling and provides as follows: 
Within one year: 
%** 
(4) an action for libel, slander, 
assault, battery, false imprisonment 
or seduction. . . . 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE. 
This is an action for damages which Plaintiff 
claims to have sustained as a result of the alleged 
professional negligence on the part of Dr. Paulos in 
examining Plaintiff's former patient and in the statements 
which Dr. Paulos made to the patient and the patient's 
attorney. The Plaintiff claims that the alleged 
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professional negligence on the part of Dr. Paulos 
precipitated a medical malpractice lawsuit against him which 
caused damage. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS. 
1. DISPOSITION BY DISTRICT COURT 
After preliminary discovery was undertaken, Dr. 
Paulos filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. The District 
Court granted Summary Judgment in favor of Dr. Paulos 
holding as follows: 
1. Dr. Paulos owed no legal duty to the plaintiff 
in connection with his examination of plaintifffs former 
patient or the statements made to her attorney. 
2. Plaintifffs claim for "injurious falsehood11 is 
a claim based upon libel and/or slander which is barred by 
the one-year statute of limitations contained in Section 
78-12-29. U.C.A. 
2. DISPOSITION BY COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court of Appeals, on its own motion, heard the 
case in accordance with the provisions of Rule 31, Rules of 
Utah Court of Appeals and entered an Order of Affirmance 
which upheld the Summary Judgment in favor of Dr. Paulos. 
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C. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The facts which give rise to the case are in 
summary as follows: 
1. June, 1982 — Plaintiff provided medical care 
to Teresa Ilene White (Ms. White) at Cottonwood Hospital for 
injuries she sustained in an auto/pedestrian accident, which 
injuries included a fracture of her right leg. (See First 
Amended Complaint, Para. 5 - 8, R. 7 -11; Amended Answer, 
Para. 2 and 3, R. 18 - 23; Plaintiff's Responses, No. 1a., 
R. 95 -111.) 
2. Subsequent to the discharge of Ms. White from 
the Hospital, she developed alignment deformities of her 
right leg. Ms. White became displeased with the condition 
of her leg and consulted Dr. Paulos. (See First Amended 
Complaint, Para. 9 and 10, R. 7 - 11; Amended Answer, Para. 
15, R. 18 - 23; Plaintiff's Responses, No. 1a., R. 95 -
111 .) 
3. October 10, 1983 — Dr. Paulos examined Ms. 
White for the purpose of evaluating the condition of her 
right leg. (See First Amended Complaint, Para. 10, R. 7 -
11; Amended Answer, Para. 5, R. 18 - 23; Plaintiff's 
Responses, No. 1a., No. 2a., R. 95 - 111.) 
4. Ms. White was contemplating bringing a medical 
malpractice lawsuit against Plaintiff and had consulted with 
an attorney to represent her in connection with this 
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claim. Ms. White's attorney requested that Dr. Paulos 
provide him with reports concerning her condition and the 
cause of the same. Dr. Paulos complied with this request 
and the letters written by him upon which the claims are 
based are as follows: 
October 25, 1983 — copy attached as Appendix C-1 
December 6, 1983 — copy attached as Appendix C-2 
April 2, 1984 — copy attached as Appendix C-3 
(See Plaintiff's Response, No. 2a, R. 95 - 111). 
5. October 23, 1987 — Plaintiff initiated legal 
action against Dr. Paulos and has asserted the following 
claims: 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION (NEGLIGENCE) 
14. Defendant negligently evaulated the 
professional services of plaintiff which 
negligent evaluation was the actual and 
proximate cause of harm suffered by 
plaintiff. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION (INJURIOUS 
FALSEHOOD) 
17. The statements made by defendant 
relative to the alleged professional 
negligence of plaintiff was false and 
published to third persons. (See First 
Amended Complaint, Para. 1 3 - 1 8 , R. 7 -
11). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
DR. PAULOS OWED NO LEGAL DOTY 
TO THE PLAINTIFF 
As indicated in the foregoing Statement of 
Facts, the Plaintiff claims that Dr. Paulos was guilty of 
professional negligence in his evaluation of the condition 
of Plaintiff's former patient; and that this evaluation 
caused Plaintiff damage as a result of the medical 
malpractice lawsuit which was filed against him. 
As an elementary principle of tort law, maintenance 
of a cause of action based upon negligence requires four 
fundamental elements: 
The elements of an action for negligence 
include: (1) a duty of reasonable care 
owed by defendant to plaintiff; (2) a 
breach of that duty; (3) causation, both 
actual and proximate of the injury; and 
(4) damages suffered by plaintiff. 
Martin v, Mott, 744 P.2d 337, 388 (Utah App. 1987). See, 
also, Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985); Bach v. 
University of Utah, 726 P.2d 413 (Utah 1986); and DCR, Inc. 
v. Peak Alarm Co., 663 P.2d 433 (Utah 1983). 
The claims asserted by Plaintiff have no legal 
foundation and were reviewed and rejected by the court in 
Kahn v. Burman, 673 F.Supp. 210 (E.D. Mich. 1987). The 
facts in Kahn are virtually identical to the facts in the 
instant case in that a physician who was a defendant in a 
medical malpractice action brought an action against 
plaintiff's expert asserting claims of negligence, 
fraudulent and innocent misrepresentation, defamation, and 
intentional infliction of emotional distress. The claims 
were based upon the reports prepared by the expert and upon 
his deposition testimony. The Court, adjudicating the 
negligence claim, held as follows: 
This delineation of a witnesses1 duty 
makes it apparent that Dr. Burman, as a 
consultant and potential witness and 
ultimately an expert witness, owed no 
legal duty to Dr. Kahn, an adverse 
litigant. 
Utah has long recognized that the duty of a 
professional such as a physician or attorney runs to the 
patient or client and not to third parties. This principle 
was set forth by the Supreme Court of Utah in the case of 
Hughes v. Housley, 599 P.2d 1250 (Utah 1979). In Hughes, 
the client brought an action for legal malpractice against 
his first attorney; the first attorney filed a Third-Party 
Complaint against the second attorney. The Supreme Court 
affirmed the dismissal of the Third-Party Complaint and 
stated as follows: 
A finding of negligence required the 
presence of certain elements, one of 
which is a duty running between the 
parties. It is apparent from the facts 
of this controversy that no duty ever 
arose between the parties. Had Housley 
[the first attorney] been Cotro-Manes1 
[the second attorney] client, then Cotro-
Manes would have had a duty to Housley. 
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Cotro-Manes1 client, however, was Hughes 
[the plaintiff]. It has long been held, 
with few exceptions not applicable here, 
that the obligation of an attorney is to 
his client and not a third party 
(emphasis added). 
Additionally, the Court in Kahn, supra, held that 
the expertfs reports were relevant to the judicial 
proceedings and, therefore, subject to absolute protection 
under the "Witness Immunity" doctrine: 
Physicians' reports are so inextricably 
interwined with medical malpractice 
actions that it would be illogical to 
hold that such reports are not "relevant" 
to the underlying judicial proceedings 
[citations omitted]. To hold otherwise 
would defeat the purpose of witness 
immunity, which is to ensure that the 
judicial process functions "unimpeded by 
fear on the part of its participants that 
they will be sued for damages for their 
part in the proceedings." [citation 
omitted]. 
As a matter of policy, also, witness 
immunity should be extended to repc ts 
prepared by both potential and retained 
expert witnesses. . . . 
The cases cited by Plaintiff for the proposition 
that no contractual relationship is required between a 
plaintiff and defendant to support an action based on 
negligence are inapplicable inasmuch as all of them involve 
claim for physical injury to person or property. (These 
cases are contained on pages 5 and 6 of Plaintiff's Petition 
and will not be re-cited here as they have no application). 
Plaintiff also asserts that his action can be 
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maintained based upon a claim of "negligence 
misrepresentation" which does not require privity between 
the parties. However, plaintiff's claim in the instant case 
lacks two essential elements of the tort of negligent 
misrepresentation which have been established by the Supreme 
Court of Utah as follows: 
Where (1) one having a pecuniary interest 
in a transaction, (2) is in a superior 
position to know material facts, and (3) 
carelessly or negligently make a false 
representation concerning them, (4) 
expecting the other party to rely and act 
thereon, and (5) the other party 
reasonably does so, and C51 suffers loss 
in that transaction, the representor can 
be held responsible if the other elements 
of fraud are also present. 
Christensen v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins. Co., 666 P.2d 
302 (Utah 1983) (emphasis added). As can be seen by the 
Statement of Facts, the statements which Dr. Paulos made to 
Ms. White and her attorney were not made with the intent 
that Plaintiff would rely on the same nor does Plaintiff 
claim that he relied on such statements. 
The thrust of Plaintiff's claim is that a 
professional who is retained as an expert consultant and/or 
witness owes a duty to the party whose conduct he is 
reviewing to act in an nonnegligent manner and asks this 
Court to create a new tort of "expert witness 
malpractice". Plaintiff cites no cases which support this 
novel cause of action and indeed no such cases have been 
found. It is readily apparent that the creation of such a 
cause of action would give rise to a never ending cycle of 
lawsuits wherein the prevailing party would sue the expert 
consultants and/or witnesses retained by the opposing party 
in all cases where expert opinions were expressed that a 
professional had committed malpractice in his particular 
field* As Judge Richard Davidson euphemistically pointed 
out at the time of oral argument before the Court of 
Appeals, such a cause of action would create a substantial 
"growth industry" for the legal profession, which our 
society simply could not endure. 
POINT II. 
PLAINTIFFfS CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
It is apparent from a review of Plaintiff1 s First 
Amended Complaint and Responses that the claim which he 
asserts is for libel and/or slander (defamation) 
notwithstanding his characterization of the same as an 
"injurious falsehood". Plaintiff bases his claim upon the 
statements which Dr. Paulos made to Ms. White and upon the 
letters which he wrote to her attorney. The relevant dates 
are, again, as follows: 
October 10, 1983 — examination. 
October 25, 1983 — letter to attorney. 
December 6, 1983 — letter to attorney. 
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April 2, 1984 — letter to attorney. 
October 23, 1987 -- legal action filed. 
Plaintiff attempts to avoid the effect of the 
one-year statute of limitations by arguing that the claim is 
based on an "injurious falsehood" rather than defamation and 
that, consequently, the four year statute of limitations 
contained in Section 78-12-25, U.C.A. is applicable. 
In Direct Import Buyers1 Assoc, v. KSL, Inc., 538 
P.2d 1040 (Utah 1975), the Court equated "injurious 
falsehood" with "slander of title" and "product 
disparagement" actions and noted: 
The basis upon which plaintiff claims a 
right to recover is libel and slander, 
but it is actually for injurious 
falsehood. The principle of slander of 
title, while similar, is not quite the 
same, for in this case there is no 
disparagement of plaintifffs title. It 
is merely a deprication of the quality of 
plaintiff's product. 
538 P.2d at 1042, see also Jack B. Parson Companies vs. 
Nield, 751 P.2d 1131 (Utah 1988). The facts of this case 
cannot support an action for "slander of title" or "product 
disparagement". The plaintiff's mislabeling of his claim 
while imaginative does not change the true character of the 
same and has no substantive legal effect. 
Further, the great weight of authority is that even 
if Plaintiff's action is characterized as one for injurious 
falsehood, it is still governed by the statute of 
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limitations relating to defamation actions. Plaintiff cites 
Idaho norland Corp. v. Caelter Indus,, Inc., 509 F.Supp. 
1070 (D. Colo. 1981) in support of his position that a claim 
for injurious falsehood is not governed by the statute of 
limitations applicable to actions for defamation. However, 
in Idano Norland, the Court recognized that a majority of 
jurisdictions apply the statute of limitations for 
defamation to true claims for injurious falsehood. There is 
no logical reason to have a different statute of limitations 
applicable to claims for defamation and claims for injurious 
falsehood, and in recognizing this, the Oregon Supreme Court 
succinctly concluded: 
We can see no substantial reason why the 
legislature would make any distinction 
between an action involving defamation of 
title to property and one based upon 
defamation of the person. A study of the 
historical development of the statute of 
limitations in this state confirms us in 
the view that the limitation as to the 
commencement of action for libel and 
slander is the same whether the slander 
involves property or the person. 
Woodward v. Pacific Fruit Produce Co., 106 P.2d 1043, 1046 
(Or. 1940). 
The Plaintiff's action, whether it be deemed 
"defamation" or "injurious falsehood" is subject to the one-
year statute of limitations and is untimely. 
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CONCLUSION 
The District Court and the Court of Appeals 
correctly held that Dr. Paulos owed no legal duty to the 
Plaintiff and that his action based upon "negligence" cannot 
be maintained. Further, Plaintiff did not and could not 
have relied upon the statements made by Dr. Paulos and, 
thus, no cause of action for "negligent misrepresentation" 
arose. 
Plaintiff's claim for "injurious falsehood" is 
factually and legally one for libel and/or slander and the 
District Court and Court of Appeals correctly held that it 
was subject to the one-year statute of limitations. 
The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be 
denied. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this M * day of August, 
1989 
IPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
J.\ ANTHONY EYRE 
ittorneys for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the // day of August, 
1989, 4 true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief in 
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari, were mailed 
to the following: 
James E. Morton 
Ronald C. Wolthuis 
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
bJJtdLjj, C^^u 
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APPENDIX 
— i i i — 
Tab A 
r- s L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
Dr. Jonathan Home, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
JUN134889 
VJiah. Court e i A&?6<rff 
ORDER OF AFFIRMANCE 
Case No. 880461-CA 
Before Judges Garff, Davidson and Croft (Retired District Judge 
Sitting by Special Assignment) (On Rule 31 Hearing). 
The summary judgment of the district court is affirmed. 
.^ -
5ATED~lhiis 13th day of ..June, 1989 . 
••OR THE COURT: 
- i v -
TabB 
J UN 15 1938 
J. ANTHONY EYRE (#1022) 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Attorney for Defendant 
City Centre I, #330 
175 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 521-3773 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DR. JONATHAN HORNE, : 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR 
Plaintiff, : OF DR. LONNIE E. PAULOS 
vs. : 
DR. LONNIE E. PAULOS, : Civil No. C87-6961 
Defendant. : Judge Leonard H. Russon 
The Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant 
Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos came on for hearing before Judge 
Leonard H. Russon on May 23, 1988; plaintiff, Dr. Jonathan 
Home (Dr. Home), being represented by his attorney, James 
E. Moreton; defendant, Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos (Dr. Paulos), 
being represented by his attorney, J. Anthony Eyre; the 
Court having considered the record of the case, including 
the Memoranda of the parties, having heard the arguments 
of counsel and having concluded that Dr. Paulos had no 
legal duty to the plaintiff, Dr. Home, with respect to 
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the evaluation by Dr. Paulos of the medical services provided 
by Dr. Home to Teresa Ilene White and thus the claim for 
negligence cannot be legally made; the Court having further 
concluded that the plaintiff's claim for "injurious 
falsehood11 is a claim based upon liable and/or slander 
and the statements giving rise to the claim were published 
more than one year prior to the time the action was 
commenced; 
Now therefor, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion 
for Summary Judgment of defendant, Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos, 
is granted and the Amended Complaint of the plaintiff, 
Dr. Jonathan Home, against defendant, Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos, 
is dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this /V day of June, 1988. 
BY THE COURT: 
LEONARD H. RUSSON 
District Court Judge 
-vi-
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
MAILED, postage prepaid, this fr^h day of 
June, 1988, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Summary 
Judgment in Favor of Dr. Lonnie E. Paulos, to the following: 
James E. Morton 
HATCH, MORTON & SKEEN 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
1245 Brickyard Road, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
yj^ffr / (7~,'Y?'TTS 
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TabC 
r) hn-.'u«.N D HuMinlnMg. M.D. 
October 25, 1983 
Mr. Roger Sharp 
Suite 1030 
185 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
RE: Teresa Ilene White 
Dear Mr. Sharp: 
Cn October 10, 1983 I saw Teresa Ilene White in the office for evaluation and second 
opinion. Teresa is a 16 year old white female who was involved in a serious auto-
pedestrian accident in June, 1982. At that tine she apparently suffered multiple 
injuries including a fracture-dislocation of her mandible, ccnminuted, both bone 
fracture of the right lower leg as well as a transverse both bene fracture of the 
left lower leg. Apparently the patient was taken to the Cottonwood Hospital Bnergency 
Roan where she was treated and referred to Dr. Home for definitive treatment of her 
tibial fractures. Because the left fracture was open the patient was taken ijnrediately 
to surgery. The left tibia was debrided, irrigated and an cpen reduction internal 
fixation with hardware used at that time. Apparently conccmitant work was being done 
by Dr. Walker cn facial lacerations and her mandibular fracture. At that time 
Dr. Home did a closed manipulation of the fracture of the right tibia and a post-
operative knee splint was applied. It was felt by Dr. Home that a snug postoperative 
cast could not be used because of the severe swelling present. Also because of the * 
multiple other injuries he elected closed reduction of this leg rather than cpen ancj 
felt as though he could hold the reduction through casting. 
In reviewing postoperative x-ray readings by the Radiology Department at the Cbttonwcod 
Hospital, the closed reducticn of the right tibia was successful and according to 
x-rays on June 29, 1982 axial alignment of that fracture with cortical apposition 
was present. The patient was subsequently discharged, to be followed by both Dr. Home 
and Dr. Walker as an outpatient. 
Between the patientfs discharge and the end of July, 1982, the patient questioned the 
orthopedic care she was receiving and transferred the care of Teresa to Dr. Reed Fogg. 
Available to me were office notes from Dr. Fogg's chart. The first note being dated 
July 22, 1982. According to his notes Teresa had been placed in a long leg cast cn 
the right following the closed reduction and immediately around the hospital discharge 
time. By August 31, 1982 Dr. Poggfs notes relate that the left leg has "corplete ; 
healing". The right tibia which had been previously plated was also showing "good 
healing". The last note in Dr. Fogg's chart, dated March 1, 1983, states that Teresa 
is doing extremely well and walking almost without a limp. He felt as though further 
therapy was necessary and she was to return to see him in six weeks. 
APPENDIX CI 
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5age 2 
lr. Poger Sharp 
3ince that time, according to Teresa's history, she has developed right knee problens 
/ith giving away episodes, recurrent pain and swelling in the knee and aching pain along 
:he anterior medial tibia an the right. She feels as though her left tibia is 
essentially asymptomatic and her main problems new are her mandible and right lower leg. 
She also oanplains of the leg being "crooked" and that it "hyperextends" and "pops". 
the feels as though she has had to learn to walk in a different way and is displeased, 
/ith the result thus far. 
Physical examination demonstrates the patient to walk with a slightly antalgic gait 
:o the right leg. No swelling is noted in the right knee. A recurvatum position as 
:onpared to the left knee is noted as well as an increased varus position* Crepitation 
Ls noted in the right subpatellar area slightly more than the left. Patellofemoral 
alignment, per se, is normal and nonral laxity is present. There was no ligamentous 
Instability noted in the knee or meniscal findings. There was a slight leg length 
ilscrepancy, left shorter than right, perhaps one-half inch* Muscle atrophy in both 
Lower extremities consistent with the severity of the injury ard subsequent treatment 
*as noted. 
<-rays obtained of the right proximal tibia demonstrated 8 degrees of recurvatum and 
L5 degrees of varus secondary to the previous fracture and healing. 
rt is my opinion that the present position of the right tibia will lead to progressive 
eight knee problems secondary to malposition. Although the amount of recurvatum 
present by itself could possibly be tolerated the 15 degrees of varus will not be. 
""his type of positioning will lead to progressive deterioration and arthritis of the 
jiee and should be surgically corrected sometime in the near future. I believe the 
present knee symptoms which Teresa White is suffering from are not only seoondary to 
the significant trauma which she sustained in the auto-pedestrian accident and subsequent 
Tiuscle atrophy but also secondary to the malposition of the tibial fracture fragments 
and serve as an early warning that surgical correction should be entertained in the 
:iear future. 
rJhile in the office, the patient's mother raised the issue of medical malpractice seoondary 
to the right tibia positicn. As I explained to the patient and her mother medical 
nalpractice is a legal issue which needs to be decided in a court of law. I can only 
state at this time that in my opinion, the present tibial position is not consistent 
with acceptable community standards. I, however, would encourage you to obtain several 
[tore opinions in that the treatment of tibial fractures is difficult at best and the 
surrounding issue of rredical malpractice concerning tibial fractures should involve 
more than one or twoi opinions. 
/ / / 
Should you have any/fuijicher need for information please feel free to contact me. 
Sincerely, 
Ionnie E. Pa 
\j 
TEP/ml w 
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honias D. Rosenberg, M.D. Lonnie E. Paulos ; M.D. 
December 6, 1983 
Mr. Roger T. Sharp 
Suite 1030 
185. South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
:EE:~-Supplemental Information Reoardincr 
Teresa White , 
Dear Mr." Sharo: 
•m response to your letter Nbveriber 16th I am su^lyiixj tik: following iniformaticn.' 
Thetype of surgery.\Mch'I have suggested to'Miss White"is.'a corrective osteotomy 
*pf-the.tibia. This would require-appradTO 
siicgery- with a hardware fixation *Mch then would subsequently* have'to be .removed 
pn.:aV:seoandary surgery approximately a year to: two y e ^ ..later.
 ; Ccnc^rning the 
questaJm.as'the issue of future quality of realignmsnt I '.am sorry•--that'• I" cannot 
iespor^ . ^ I am not quite sure vihat you mean* • Certainly .the knee can be 
realigned so as to minimize further problems- As to the'extentof /damage that has 
occurred in the knee joint itself secondary to the malalignment cannot be assessed 
by physical examination alcne. It is my feeling that in view of the short period 
of
 t time between her accident and the time of this evaluation that .the permanent 
damage "to the knee is very slight. 
The estimate of surgical costs would be in the neighborhood of. $5,000 for the first 
surgery and perhaps $2,000 for the second surgery. 
In.tespcnse to theseccnd paragraph of your letter I just-wish to 'state that* I' feel 
Miss White's present alignment of her limb is unacceptable."v I have explained to them 
that a realignment is necessary to preserve the prefer .functioning of the ankle and 
knee articulations in that extremity. ... v : . 
Should vou need any further informaticn please feel free to contact me.. 
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T h o m a s D. R o s e n b e r g , M.D. L o n n i e E. Paulos , M.D. 
April 2, 1984 
Roger T. Sharp 
Attorney at Law 
Suite 1030 
185 South State St. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
HE: Teresa White 
Dear Mr, Sharp: 
I apologize for the delay in returning my response to you but have been rather busy 
of late. 
In specific response to ycur questions labelled a through h I am responding • 
Question a. Was the medical management of Ms* White by her original treating 
physician acceptable for a specialist in orthopedic surgery? 
I feel that the majority of her treatment was certainly acceptable and within the 
guidelines established in this medical coimunity. She was left, however, with a 
permanent deformity of her right tibia which by these iredical connunity standards 
as well as cannon orthopedic textbcok standards is unacceptable, 
Question b. What specific deviations in acceptable medical care do you believe occurred 
regarding this young girl? 
I believe the acceptance of a malunion beyond those limits normally accepted by orthopedic 
surgeons for her right tibia fracture is, a deviation"frcra normal. I wish to stress to 
you hcwever the need for one or two other opinions in this regard. As I mentioned to 
you en the telephone the treatment of tibial fractures is very difficult and many 
times requires the acceptance of less than perfect reduction. I believe that the amount 
of accepted deformity in Teresa White's right tibia is excessive but do feel several 
other opinions should be obtained to confirm my own. 
Question c. What is the current physical condition of Ms. White's lower extremities. 
I refer you to my letter of October 25, 1983 because I believe it answers this specif ical: 
Question d. What curative or remedial actions do you propose in an effort to correct 
Ms. White's current misalignment in her lower extremities? 
I wish to correct that in that misalignment only occurs in the right extrenity and not 
the left. I would propose that she will require a corrective osteotomy of the tibia 
with hardware fixation followed by a second procedure to remove the hardware. Probably 
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autogenous bone grafting will be required at this same setting. 
Question e. What is the estimated cost for all hospital and medical expenses for 
this future corrective surgery? 
I am only guessing, but I suspect that we will be talking in the neighborhood of 
$10,000. 
Question f. When do you reconnend surgery for Mrs. White in the future? 
As soon as possible. 
Question g. Please estimate the type and degree of corrective alignment you expect 
in future surgery for Ms. White. 
Obviously we expect to achieve normal alignment but what can be obtained will be 
dependent upon the conditions at surgery. Our plan will be to correct the large 
amount of varus and recurvatum which she presently has meaning a biplanar osteotomy, 
Biplanar osteotaides are difficult to perform and to control so the final obtained 
alignment will be dependent on the surgical outcome. 
Question h. Based upon reasonable medical judgement what will be the extent of any 
residual problems for Ms. White because of her original inappropriate care? 
At this time it is difficult to eminent on this question. She has had intermittent 
knee problems and it is possible that an arthroscopic evaluation at the time of her 
tibia realignment will help assess any knee damage. Obviously knee damage can cone 
from the severity of her previous accident as well as from the malalignment which is 
present in the tibia. I honestly believe that a majority of Ms. White's problems 
are probably a result of her original injury rather than mistreatment. The need for 
osteotomy and corrective surgery is to prevent jf^ refeher problens in the future. 
Should you need^opy further information please feel free to contact me. 
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